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Abstract 
A common criticism of antipoverty programs is that the high share of 
administrative (nontransfer) costs substantially reduces their effectiveness in alleviating 
poverty.  Yet there is surprisingly little hard empirical evidence on such programs￿ costs.  
A recent international review of targeted poverty alleviation programs in less developed 
countries found cost information￿which was rarely comparable between studies￿for 
fewer than one-third of the programs examined.  Improved information and a better 
understanding of the costs of such programs are crucial for effective policymaking.  This 
study proposes and implements a methodology for a comparative analysis of the level 
and structure of costs of three similar poverty alleviation programs in Latin America, in 
order to assess their cost-efficiency.  The findings underscore that any credible 
assessment of cost-efficiency requires a detailed analysis of program cost structures that 
goes well beyond simply providing aggregate cost information. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely accepted that social safety nets have a crucial role to play both in 
alleviating poverty and promoting social and economic development (World Bank 1997).  
A common criticism of such programs, however, is that a large proportion of their budget 
is absorbed by administrative costs and never reaches the intended beneficiaries.
1  How 
these resources are used affects the poverty alleviation benefits of the program and, 
consequently, its overall cost-effectiveness. 
There is very little rigorous empirical evidence on the costs and cost structures of 
social safety net programs in developing countries, however, that makes proper 
assessment of the criticism that such programs are ￿expensive￿ difficult.
2  For example, 
in their review of targeted poverty alleviation programs in developing countries, Coady, 
Grosh, and Hoddinott (2002) find cost information of any sort for only 32 of the 111 
programs examined, and most of these were from a single source on Latin America 
(Grosh 1994).  Moreover, the available cost information is rarely comparable between 
studies, even for similar programs.  Some studies refer to administrative costs, while 
others consider costs only in terms of theft or other losses and leakages.  When the focus 
is on administrative costs, it is often unclear whether the figures refer to the entire life of 
the program or only a specific period, such as the most recent year.  For programs that 
have high initial fixed costs, undergo extensive learning-by-doing, or are at different 
stages of maturity, analyses based on different time periods can lead to very different 
conclusions.  Improved information and a better understanding of the costs of such 
programs are crucial for effective policymaking. 
                                                 
1 For example, in her review of poverty alleviation programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, Grosh 
(1994, 46) finds that ￿Concern over high administrative costs is perhaps the reason that is most commonly 
given for not adopting targeted programs￿ [our emphasis]. 
2 Newman, Rawlings, and Gertler (1994) argue that ￿Most published impact evaluations pay little attention 
to costs￿both the costs of carrying out the intervention and those of conducting the evaluation￿ (183), and 
￿More effort needs to be devoted to collecting and reporting information on the costs of carrying out 
specific interventions￿[and] the costs of conducting evaluation studies￿ (197). 2 
This study proposes and implements a methodology for a detailed, comparative 
analysis of the level and structure (the various activities being carried out) of costs for 
three similar poverty alleviation programs in Latin America.  They are the Programa 
Nacional de Educaci￿n, Salud y Alimentaci￿n (PROGRESA) in Mexico, the Programa 
de Asignaci￿n Familiar-Fase II (PRAF) in Honduras, and the pilot Red de Protecci￿n 
Social (RPS) in Nicaragua.  The primary objective of these programs is to generate a 
sustained decrease in poverty in some of the most disadvantaged regions in their 
respective countries.  The programs￿ underlying premise is that a major cause of the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty is the inability of poor households to invest in 
the human capital of their children.  Supply-side interventions on their own, which 
increase the availability and quality of education and health services, are often ineffective 
in resolving this problem, since the resource constraints facing poor households preclude 
them from incurring the private costs associated with utilizing these services (e.g., travel 
costs or opportunity cost of women￿s and children￿s time).  These innovative programs 
address this problem by targeting transfers to the poorest communities and households 
and by conditioning the transfers on attendance at school and health clinics.  This 
conditionality effectively transforms cash transfers into human capital subsidies for poor 
households. 
Since the total program budgets are the sum of administrative costs and total (cash 
and in-kind) transfers, we evaluate the cost-efficiency of each program by considering the 
cost of making a one unit transfer to a beneficiary; this is the ￿cost-transfer ratio￿ or CTR 
(Coady, Perez, and Vera-Llamas 2004).
3  How we use and interpret the CTR depends on 
how it is calculated and on program characteristics.  Features of the program, such as 
targeting and monitoring, size, type and delivery mechanism of the transfers (e.g., cash or 
in kind, demand- or supply-side), coverage, duration, and whether the program is 
expanding influence the CTR.  So do whether the fixed costs of setting up the program 
                                                 
3 In some frameworks, leakage to the nonpoor is also considered as a program cost (Besley and Kanbur 
1993); we do not do this.  See Section 5 as well as Coady (2001), MNPTSG (2002), and IFPRI (2002) for 
discussions of targeting in the three programs. 3 
(or just recurring costs) are included and whether the entire life of the program or a 
specific period is under consideration.  We highlight these and other issues in the cost 
analysis and propose strategies for resolving them.  We show how cost information can 
be used to assess the relative cost-efficiency of the different programs, making clear that 
understanding the details that go into the calculations and the design differences between 
programs is essential for making sensible comparisons, even for similar programs such as 
the three considered in this paper. 
While focusing on CTRs would be sufficient to evaluate a program whose sole 
objective was to disburse transfers, the programs considered in this paper have more 
ambitious goals and design features aimed at achieving them.  First, transfers are targeted 
to poor areas and to poor households within those areas.  Second, transfers are 
conditioned on households investing in the nutrition, health, and education of their 
children.  The combination of targeting and conditioning makes these programs 
operationally and administratively complex, which can be expected to affect both the 
level and structure of program costs, as well as program performance.  Hence, there is a 
potential trade-off:  reducing the CTR may not be cost-effective if it comes at the expense 
of activities devoted to important administrative tasks, such as targeting the poor or 
monitoring compliance.
4  It would therefore be incorrect to interpret the CTR as a 
measure of overall cost-effectiveness, and we thus refer to the CTR as a measure of 
￿cost-efficiency.￿  We use the term ￿cost-effectiveness￿ only when we incorporate 
broader program objectives into the analysis. 
Section 2 motivates our approach to analyzing cost-efficiency with a simple 
model of the welfare impact of antipoverty programs.  Section 3 describes the three 
programs.  Section 4 presents the comparison of costs between programs, showing how 
one can move from accounting data to detailed breakdowns of cost structures to measures 
                                                 
4 The importance of this trade-off is noted by Grosh (1994, 46):  ￿The conclusion that total administrative 
costs are low must be somewhat tempered, however.  In several of the programs, it appears that low 
administrative budgets have led to deficient program management.  Spending more on administration with 
a given program framework might lead to better service quality, better incidence, or both.￿ 4 
of cost-efficiency.  Section 5 briefly discusses the ￿cost-effectiveness￿ of these programs, 
summarizing the evidence on their targeting effectiveness and human capital impacts.  
Section 6 concludes. 
2.  A Simple Model 
This section presents a simple model to characterize how we think about the 
welfare impact of these programs.  The model underlies our approach to assessing cost-
efficiency.
5  Consider a program that transfers resources to households in two forms, pure 
cash transfers and in-kind transfers in the form of increased expenditures on human 
capital services (e.g., education and health services).  Maximized household (denoted h) 
utility is given by an indirect utility function, V
h(m
h, E; q), which is a function of the cash 
transfer received from the program, m
h, the increased expenditures on human capital 
services, E, and commodity and factor prices, q.
6  For expositional convenience, we 
assume that initial transfers and expenditures are zero, so that dm
h = m
h and dE = E. 
Social welfare is measured by a standard Bergson-Samuelson social welfare 
function: 






H, E; q)}, 
defined over h = 1￿H households.  The welfare impact of the program is derived by 
differentiating W with respect to cash transfers and in-kind expenditures on services.  
Holding factor and commodity prices constant, this yields 



























which can be rewritten as 
                                                 
5 In particular, the model abstracts from some of the issues motivating government intervention￿such as 
market failures￿that could justify programs of the type considered in the paper. 
6 Boldface characters represent vectors. 5 





h h ∑ ∑ + = β β , 
where (MV
h/Mm
h) is the private marginal utility of income, β
h is defined as the social value 
of additional lump-sum income to household h (the so-called welfare weight, which is 
typically larger for poorer households), m
h is the lump-sum income given to the 
household by the program, WTP
h is the household￿s willingness-to-pay for an extra unit 
of program expenditures on human capital services (i.e., (MV
h/ME) divided by (MV
h/Mm
h)), 
and E is the total expenditures by the program on these services.  The total welfare 
impact of the program is thus the sum of the social valuation of cash and in-kind 
transfers.  This valuation depends, for example, on how many of these benefits accrue to 
poor households as well as on the effectiveness of in-kind transfers. 
Dividing each term by total cash transfers (T = 3hm
h) and the sum of households￿ 
willingness-to-pay (WTP = 3hWTP
h) yields 
  ∑ ∑ × + =
hh
h h h h E WTP T dW φ β θ β , 
where θ
h is the share of each household in the total cash transfer budget and φ
h is the 
share of each household in the aggregate willingness-to-pay across households.  For 
expositional convenience, we assume that the share of each household￿s cash transfers in 
the total cash transfers (θ
h) is the same as the share of each household in the aggregate 
willingness-to-pay (φ
h).  Thus, 
 dW = α (T + WTP × E), 
where α can be interpreted as capturing the progressiveness of transfers.  The total cost to 
the government of providing benefits (B) is made up of the sum of cash transfers (T), 
total in-kind expenditures (E), and total program operational costs (C): 
 B  = T + E + C. 6 









) ( α , 
which is the welfare impact per unit program expenditure (i.e., the benefit-cost ratio) 
multiplied by B, the size of the program.  A full cost-benefit analysis of the program 
would require an evaluation of both the targeting effectiveness of the program (as 
captured by α) as well as the true benefits arising from in-kind expenditures (as captured 
by WTP).  This is beyond the scope of this paper. 
To focus in on cost-efficiency, we make two further simplifying assumptions.  
First, we set α = 1; this is equivalent to setting welfare weights to β = {1,0} for {poor, 
nonpoor} households and assuming that all transfers accrue to poor households, i.e., 
perfect targeting.  Second, we value in-kind expenditures at cost, i.e., the total 
willingness-to-pay across households for an extra dollar of in-kind expenditures is 
exactly one dollar, so that the total welfare impact of the program is given by the sum of 
cash and in-kind transfers (multiplied by the progressiveness parameter, α).  This 
assumption is the same as that typically made in benefit-incidence analyses of public 














= 1 1 , 
where CTR is the cost-transfer ratio defined earlier, i.e., the ratio of nontransfer program 
costs to total program transfers.  Since this measure of efficiency abstracts from 
important program effectiveness issues, we refer to it as a ￿cost-efficiency ratio.￿ 
Finally, since some components of program nontransfer costs (C) can affect the 
overall cost-effectiveness of the program, it is not necessarily desirable to minimize this 
ratio.  For example, program expenditures arising from setting up and implementing 7 
program targeting rules will presumably have a return in terms of improved targeting 
effectiveness (higher α), but while the costs will be included in the CTR, the benefits will 
not.  Similarly, expenditures associated with setting up and implementing mechanisms 
for monitoring adherence to program rules will presumably lead to greater effects on 
human capital, but will also only be reflected as a cost in the CTR.  Although we do not 
attempt to calculate a measure of cost-effectiveness for each program, in Section 5 we 
discuss the existing evidence on the relative targeting effectiveness and human capital 
impacts of the programs, facilitating a more complete comparison of program costs. 
3.  Design and Implementation of the Programs 
To analyze the cost structures of these complex programs, it is necessary to 
understand how they operate and how they have evolved.  Table 1 summarizes some 
basic features of each program. 
Table 1￿Program characteristics 
  PROGRESA (Mexico)  PRAF Phase II (Honduras)  RPS Pilot (Nicaragua) 
Years (in study)  1997-2000  1999-2002 2000-2002 
Budgeted  $998 million in 2000  $50 million over three years  $11 million over three years 
Coverage 2,600,000  rural 
households end-1999, in 
all 31 states 
47,800 rural households end-
2002, in 40 of 297 
municipalities 
10,000 rural households end-
2002, in six of 151 municipalities 
Components Education  and  health 
demand-side transfers 
Education and health demand- 
and supply-side transfers 
Education and health demand- 
and supply-side transfers 
Targeting methods  Geographic and proxy-
means test 
Geographic and categorical  Geographic and proxy-means test 
 
Programa Nacional de Educaci￿n, Salud y Alimentaci￿n (PROGRESA) 
PROGRESA (Mexico) started in 1997 and was the prototype for the other two 
programs.
7  Its cash transfers have two components.  Children over age 7 (the starting age 
for Grade 3) are eligible for education transfers.  Transfers increase by grade and are 
                                                 
7 The analysis for PROGRESA draws from Coady, Perez, and Vera-Llamas (2004). 8 
higher for girls than for boys in middle school (Grades 7￿9).  In 1999, monthly benefits 
were 80 pesos for Grade 3.
8  By Grade 9, benefits rise to 265 and 305 pesos for boys and 
girls, respectively.  In addition to enrollment, transfers are conditioned on an 85 percent 
attendance record, and children are allowed to repeat a grade, at most, twice. 
The second component of the transfer, for food security, health, and nutrition, is 
125 pesos per month for each household, conditioned on household members making 
regular trips to health clinics for a range of preventive health checks and attending 
monthly nutrition and hygiene information sessions.  The education and food security 
transfers are independent:  beneficiaries can receive one and not the other, even if they 
are eligible for both.  In addition to the cash transfers, beneficiary households with 
children under age 3 receive a monthly nutritional supplement intended for the infant that 
contains essential micronutrients. 
There is a ceiling of 750 pesos per month for education and food transfers 
combined.  On average, the transfer to beneficiary households constitutes around 20 
percent of preprogram annual household expenditures.  The program design of 
PROGRESA (as well as of PRAF and RPS) calls for the money to be given to mothers￿
based on evidence that resources in the hands of women often lead to better outcomes for 
child well-being and household food security (Strauss and Thomas 1995).  Transfer 
amounts are indexed to inflation and adjusted every six months, something not done in 
the other two programs. 
PROGRESA was targeted in two stages.  The first stage identified the most 
marginal rural localities, using a specially constructed ￿marginality index￿ constructed 
from the national census.  The selected localities were then visited to ensure they had 
access to the required supporting infrastructure (schools and health clinics).  The second 
stage targeted households within eligible localities, using specially collected census data 
to classify households as ￿poor￿ or ￿nonpoor,￿ based on a statistical analysis of income 
and other household characteristics.  After beneficiary households are identified, a 
                                                 
8 In 1999, the exchange rate was approximately 10 pesos per U.S. dollar. 9 
general assembly is held to explain the objectives of the program, to incorporate 
households, and to inform them of their responsibilities and rights. 
The expansion of the program throughout Mexico took place in several phases.  
The census data collection for the first and second phases began in October 1996.  These 
data were used to develop the statistical model for classifying households as poor or 
nonpoor.  In August 1997, Phase 1 began with incorporation of 140,544 households in 
3,369 localities.  The first transfers took place in September￿October 1997.  Phase 2 
began in November 1997, when a further 160,161 households in 2,988 localities were 
incorporated, with the first transfers taking place in January 1998.  For the most part, 
expansion of the program has been determined by budget allocations, with the greatest 
expansion occurring in 1998, when nearly 1.63 million households in 43,485 localities 
were incorporated.  By the final phase in early 2000, the program had an annual budget of 
$1 billion and included nearly 2.6 million rural households in 72,345 localities in all 31 
states.  This constitutes approximately 40 percent of all rural households, or one-ninth of 
all households in Mexico. 
Programa de Asignaci￿n Familiar-Fase II (PRAF) 
PRAF (Phase II, Honduras) was implemented in the second half of 2000 and 
includes both demand- and supply-side transfers.
9  On the demand side, the education 
subsidy is 812 lempiras (L) per child per year, up to a maximum of three education 
transfers per household.
10  This transfer is conditioned on the enrollment and regular 
attendance of all children who have not yet completed Grade 4 of primary school.  The 
food security, health, and nutrition transfer provided for pregnant women and children 
under age 3, is L644 per beneficiary per year, with a maximum of two transfers per 
household.  This transfer is conditional on pregnant women and children making monthly 
trips to health clinics for preventive checkups and growth monitoring.  Transfers are 
                                                 
9 The analysis for PRAF draws from CaldØs and Coady (2003). 
10 Lempiras (L) is the Honduran currency; in 2000, the exchange rate was approximately L15 per US1$. 10 
distributed twice a year and, on average, comprise about 4 percent of preprogram total 
household annual expenditures (one-fifth of the equivalent percentage of PROGRESA). 
Unlike PROGRESA, where the supply side is left to the education and health 
ministries to manage, PRAF directly invests resources to ensure adequate supply-side 
services.  For education, PRAF makes grants to school parent associations to be spent on 
local schools.  For health and nutrition, PRAF makes grants to local health service 
committees to improve the quality of health care provided by the government health 
system, and it implements a community-based child growth and monitoring program that 
provides mothers with one-on-one counseling. 
The program was geographically targeted to poor municipalities, which were 
chosen by ranking all municipalities according to the average rates of stunting observed 
in the 1997 National Census of the Height of First-Graders.  Seventy municipalities with 
the highest rates of stunting were considered eligible (MNPTSG 2002).  Of these, 50 
were randomly selected, leaving the others as a control group for the program evaluation.  
In 40 of the chosen municipalities, all households with pregnant women, children under 
age 3, and/or children aged 6￿12 who had not yet completed Grade 4 of primary school 
were eligible for benefits (the remaining 10 municipalities selected received only the 
supply-side transfers described below).  Transfers began in November 2000 and, by the 
end of 2002, PRAF had 47,800 beneficiaries and was operating in 50 rural municipalities 
(out of a total of 298) from seven departments.  Eighty-seven percent of the households in 
these departments are classified as poor. 
Red de Protecci￿n Social (RPS) 
The third program, RPS (Nicaragua), began as a pilot in 2000 in rural areas in the 
northern part of the central region of Nicaragua.
11  Each participating household receives 
a food security, health, and nutrition transfer of 240 c￿rdobas (C$) per month, conditional 
on taking children under age 5 to health clinics for scheduled appointments and attending 
                                                 
11 The analysis for RPS draws from CaldØs and Maluccio (2004). 11 
health and nutrition information clinics.
12  To receive a monthly education transfer of 
C$120 per household, households with children ages 7￿13 who have not completed 
Grade 4 of primary school have to ensure their enrollment and over 85 percent attendance 
at school.  In addition, the household receives C$275 annually upon enrollment for each 
eligible child in school.  The money covers school supplies (e.g., uniforms and shoes) and 
C$60 annually to be handed over to the teacher.  Half of that amount is intended to 
supplement teacher salaries, and the other half to purchase school materials.  Similar to 
PROGRESA (though much larger than PRAF), these two transfers constitute, on average, 
approximately C$3,800 (or US$300), which comprised 18 percent of total annual 
household expenditures for beneficiary households before the program. 
Like PRAF, RPS has supply-side components, though they differ substantially.  
For education, there is the incentive paid to the teachers per student beneficiary described 
above.  For health and nutrition, to ensure adequate supply in the poor, rural communities 
in which it is operating, RPS trains (and pays) private providers to deliver the health-care 
services required by the program, as well as to assist with monitoring household 
compliance of program requirements.  These services, provided free to beneficiary 
households, are focused on children under age 5 and include growth and development 
monitoring, vaccination, and provision of antiparasites, vitamins, and iron supplements.  
The materials are provided by the Ministry of Health.  Children under age 2 are seen 
monthly, while those ages 2￿5 are monitored bimonthly. 
The pilot program was implemented in two (out of 17) relatively poor 
departments in Nicaragua, chosen using a combination of poverty and operational 
criteria.  Around 80 percent of rural households in these departments are classified as 
poor.  The departments have easy physical access and communication, strong 
institutional capacity and local coordination, and reasonably good coverage of health 
posts and schools.  Six (out of the 20) municipalities from these departments were then 
chosen on the basis of their participation in an existing supply-side program emphasizing 
                                                 
12 The exchange rate in 2000 was approximately C$13 per US$1. 12 
local level participation.  A marginality index was constructed and an index score 
calculated for each of the 59 rural comarcas (administrative areas comprising one to five 
villages) in the six municipalities, using data from the 1995 national census.  Forty-two 
comarcas were chosen to participate in the first stage of the pilot phase in which there 
was to be only geographic targeting.  Twenty-one were randomly excluded from the 
program for two years, and these constituted the control group for the program evaluation 
(Maluccio and Flores 2004).  Nearly all of the 6,000 households in these areas were 
eligible to receive program benefits and received their first transfers in October 2000.  In 
the second stage of the pilot program (begun in early 2001), 80 percent (i.e., 4,000) of 
households in the remaining 17 comarcas that were not part of the evaluation were 
selected, using household targeting based on a proxy means test (IFPRI 2002). 
Program Differences 
The above descriptions make clear that while they have many similarities, the 
three programs also have important differences.  These affect how we collect and process 
cost information, interpret the CTR, and the extent to which we can make sensible 
comparisons between programs.  For example, all three programs are at different stages 
of maturity.  We have cost data for PROGRESA over four years, covering the expansion 
of the program over the years 1997￿2000.  The main expansionary period was in 1998, 
and nearly all households had been incorporated into the program by the end of 1999.  In 
this sense, PROGRESA is a mature program, having incurred the vast majority of fixed 
setup costs and incorporated all the eligible population into the program. 
PRAF was introduced in 1999, and we have cost data for 1999￿2002.  The first 
transfers began in the second half of 2000, so 2001 is the first full year of transfer 
distribution.  In late 2001, however, with the new government and change of ruling party, 
a new program team was installed, apparently without sufficient overlap with the 
previous team to ensure a smooth transition.  The result was a disruption in operations 13 
and, therefore, 2002 is not likely to reflect how the program would look in its mature 
form, when those operational problems have been resolved. 
PROGRESA is a national program, and PRAF covers one-sixth of the Honduran 
population, but the RPS pilot is much smaller.  We have cost data for three years, from 
2000, when RPS was introduced through 2002.  Since only two (bimonthly) transfers 
were made in 2000, and the health supply-side services did not begin until mid-2001, 
only the year 2002 represents a full year of benefits.  Cost information for 2002, however, 
also includes costs associated with preparations for the expansion of the program in 2003.  
Thus, although the pilot phase was nearing maturity in 2002, we will need to account for 
the fact that they are ￿contaminated￿ by costs that should be attributed to the expansion. 
In addition to the differences in program maturity, there are also important 
program-design differences.  While all three programs have a demand-side component, 
their structures and size differ.  PROGRESA is solely a demand-side program, providing 
transfers of, on average, 20 percent of total household expenditures.  RPS delivers 
similarly sized transfers, while those of PRAF are substantially smaller.  PRAF and RPS 
have significant supply-side interventions.  Further, the experiences of PRAF and RPS 
demonstrate the substantial effort that is required to simultaneously put in place both 
demand- and supply-side components.  To the extent that the supply-side components are 
relatively cost-intensive, this needs to be taken into account when comparing programs. 
Finally, even the supply-side components of PRAF and RPS differ in the services 
they provide, how those services are provided, and who pays for them.  PRAF uses the 
existing public health-care system, whereas RPS contracts private providers to deliver the 
services.  Consequently, the two programs face very different program costs, even for 
components of the services that are similar, such as vaccine provision. 
We must bear all of these differences in mind when analyzing and comparing the 
cost structure of the three programs. 14 
4.  Analysis of Program Cost Structures 
Using Existing Accounting Data 
The primary source of information on program costs is typically the program￿s 
accounting records.  It is usually straightforward to obtain annual data on total program 
costs and transfers, ingredients for the initial estimates of the cost-transfer ratio.
13  Table 
2 presents this information for each of the programs.  For PROGRESA, the average CTR 
for the program to end-2000 (total nontransfer program costs divided by total program 
transfers for four years) is 0.106.  That is, 10.6 pesos were spent on administrative costs 
for every 100 pesos transferred to households.  Equivalently, 9.6 percent of the total 
budget was absorbed by program costs.
14 
We must be careful, however, in interpreting this ratio.  First, it includes costs 
relating to the external evaluation of the program.  This was a once-off evaluation that, 
while influencing the redesign of these and other related programs, did not substantially 
affect program design or operations in real time.  This type of external evaluation must be 
distinguished from ongoing internal monitoring and evaluation, which did feed 
continuously into program decisionmaking, improving current program design and 
operations.  The external evaluation is best treated as a sunk fixed cost that would not 
recur in a fully developed mature program, whereas the internal monitoring and 
evaluation is a recurring activity.  Second, in addition to the external evaluation, the costs 
presented include a variety of other costs plausibly treated as fixed set-up costs associated 
with start-up activities.  As the program matures, average fixed costs will converge 
toward zero and the CTR will converge toward a value that reflects only variable costs.  
Lastly, for data spanning a number of years, adjustments to account for inflation and 
depreciation of capital investments can be made.
                                                 
13 The figures presented in Table 2 differ from the budgeted amounts shown in Table 1, reflecting the 
difference between budgeted and actual expenses. 
14 Calculated as follows:  10.6 ÷ (100 + 10.6) = 0.096.  The CTR is (obviously) always greater than the 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Since most fixed costs tend to be incurred at the start of the program, examining 
the annual CTR separately for each year sheds light on the relative importance of these 
types of costs over time and on the expected long-run CTR for a (more) mature program.  
As the program matures, we expect the annual CTR to decrease, since fixed costs will 
decline.  This is what we find for PROGRESA, where the annual CTR decreases rapidly 
over the four years, starting at 1.342 in the first year and declining to 0.054 in 2000.  
Even the annual CTR of 0.054 observed in 2000 might include some fixed costs, 
however, and therefore still might overestimate the long-run CTR for a fully mature 
program.  We consider this possibility and ways to control for it in the analysis below. 
We can use the evolution over time of the estimated CTRs to assess how much we 
would overestimate this measure of cost-efficiency if we base it on snapshots of the 
program in its early stages.  The final row of Table 2 presents the cumulative average 
CTR for the program.  Because of the sharp decline in estimated annual CTRs, basing the 
average CTR on only the first two or three years of data substantially overestimates the 
average calculated at end-2000, when all beneficiary households had been included and 
the program was nearing maturity.  In 1998, the cumulative average is four times as large 
as the four-year average, and even in 1999 was more than 1.5 times as large.  Had we 
carried out the analysis in early 2000 using only information to end-1999, the results for 
PROGRESA would have differed substantially.  Hence, it is important to ensure that the 
CTR estimates are as comparable as possible before attempting comparisons between 
programs, or even within a program between years. 
Apart from declining costs (mainly due to decreasing fixed costs), a second 
reason the annual CTR decreases over time has been that the programs under 
consideration have expanded, and thus total transfers are increasing.  Table 2 shows that 
transfers in PROGRESA increased fivefold between 1998 and 2000, from $149 to $775 
million.  Decreases in costs were not as pronounced, dropping from $48 to $42 million 
over the same period. 
We turn now to the other two programs.  Since they contain both demand- and 
supply-side transfers, we use the sum of these to calculate the total transfer in the 17 
denominator of the CTR.  As described in Section 2, this implicitly equates the value of a 
unit of transfer to households, regardless of whether it is given directly to the household 
in cash or indirectly via health and education (in-kind) services.  For the in-kind transfers, 
then, we are valuing their benefit, i.e., the beneficiaries￿ total willingness to pay, at the 
cost of provision.  In the case of PRAF, this includes transfers made to school parent 
associations and local health teams, as well as the cost of the community-based child 
growth program.  For RPS, it includes transfers given to teachers as well as the value of 
payments made to the private health-care providers. 
For PRAF, the average CTR for the program to end-2002, dividing total program 
costs by total demand- and supply-side transfers, is 0.499, i.e., it has cost L50 for every 
L100 transferred by the program.  Equivalently, 33 percent of the total program budget to 
end-2000 has been absorbed by administrative costs.  While this is high compared to 
PROGRESA, there are some reasons why we would expect such an unfavorable ￿raw￿ 
comparison between the programs. 
While the PRAF annual CTR begins in 2000, at a level below that of 
PROGRESA in its first year, it does not decline as dramatically or as consistently after 
that start.  Although the annual CTR falls from 0.959 to 0.305 between the first and 
second years, it increases to 0.378 in 2002.  This rise reflects both increased costs and 
decreased transfers from 2001 to 2002.  During the transition to the new program team, 
effort and resources were diverted from making demand-side transfers and other regular 
activities toward updating the beneficiary register.  As a result, the annual estimates for 
2001 or 2002 may give misleading impressions of what the long-run CTR will look like 
when the program￿s operational problems have been addressed and all or most of the 
fixed costs have been incurred. 
For the pilot RPS, the program average CTR to date is 0.629, even higher than 
that for PRAF.  For the three years of operation to end-2002, it cost C$0.63 in 
administrative costs for every C$1 distributed in demand- and supply-side transfers.  
Equivalently, administrative costs absorbed nearly 40 percent of the total program budget 
during the period.  There was a substantial decline in the annual CTR after the first year, 18 
but only a small decline between the second and third years.  The increase in total 
program transfers in 2002 is largely due to the substantial increase in supply-side 
transfers in that year￿this part of the program was begun in mid-2001, so only about 
one-half of the expected supply-side transfers for a normal operating year were made in 
2001.  The increase in total program costs over the latest two years reflects, in part, 
program activities not related to the implementation of the pilot program itself, but rather 
to the design and planning of the expansion phase of the program, which began in 2003.  
Therefore, even the year 2002 is likely to yield an overestimate of the pilot program￿s 
CTR. 
Identifying Key Program Activities and Associated Costs 
The presence of fixed costs associated with setting-up and planning program 
activities, as well as activities associated with expansion or operational difficulties, 
makes clear that it would be misleading to use the ￿unadjusted￿ CTRs presented above 
either for within program evaluation or as the basis for comparison of the relative cost-
efficiency of the three programs.  A proper comparison requires further consideration of 
the details of their cost structures, in particular, the relationship between program 
activities and costs. 
To do this, we first identify key program activities and then link them to their 
associated costs.  To the extent possible, we delineate program activities in sequential 
order in the life cycle of the program, according to whether they correspond to fixed or 
variable costs for the program, and in a manner to facilitate comparison among the 
programs.  This will enable us to better approximate the cost structure and CTR of mature 
programs.  It will also permit simulation of hypothetical alternative programs that do not 
include all the activities of the actual programs.  For example, by identifying the costs 
associated with household targeting or with the conditioning of the program, we can 
simulate CTRs with and without these program features. 19 
While any such categorization of activities is necessarily somewhat subjective, 
there are some fairly obvious, broadly defined activities in the three programs that are 
common to most social safety net programs (e.g., program design and benefit delivery).  
Others are common to targeted conditional cash transfer programs (e.g., identification 
and incorporation of beneficiaries, and conditionality). 
The key activities we identified for the three programs are:  
1.  Program design and planning:  Designing and planning program implementation, 
including the selection of program areas (geographic targeting) and coordination 
with the education and health sectors. 
2.  Identification of beneficiaries (household targeting):  Collecting, processing, 
validating, and analyzing household socioeconomic data to be used in identifying 
eligible households and for logistical planning. 
3.  Incorporation of beneficiaries:  Planning and convening beneficiary meetings in 
each community to inform participants of their responsibilities and rights under 
the program; collecting and processing participation forms. 
4.  Delivery of demand transfers:  Calculating transfers, informing beneficiaries 
about scheduled transfers, and ensuring that the transfer process is carried out in a 
timely and orderly manner. 
5.  Delivery of supply transfers:  Organizing and providing the supply-side services 
(e.g., organizing the health services provision and making payments to providers 
or to other supply-side agents). 
6.  Conditionality:  Distributing, collecting, and processing the registration, 
attendance, and performance forms to schools and health-care providers. 
7.  Monitoring and evaluation:  Overall program monitoring and internal evaluation, 
the results of which feed into ongoing adjustments made to the program. 
8.  External evaluation:  External evaluation of the program, including the evaluation 
design, collection, and processing of the baseline and follow-up surveys, and 
analysis, the results of which feed into the future redesign of these or similar 
programs. 20 
The first three activities (numbers 1￿3) must be undertaken at the outset, before 
any cash transfers are made.  Program design, including the selection of localities, is a 
sunk fixed cost that does not vary with the total size of the program (i.e., the number of 
beneficiary localities or households).  Therefore, this component of average fixed costs 
per unit of transfer (or per household) will decrease as the program expands to include 
more households, representing an economy of scale.  Identification and incorporation of 
households, on the other hand, while also fixed (at least over the medium term), involve 
one-time costs that increase with the number of households included in the program.  The 
next four activities (4￿7) recur throughout the life of the program and are expected to 
increase with the number of beneficiary households.  External evaluation, as discussed 
above, is a fixed cost that would typically end in an ongoing program. 
In collaboration with the local teams in each country and using program 
documents, we identified all the specific activities for each program, grouped them into 
one of the above key activities, and calculated the fraction of time spent by program 
personnel on each activity in each year.
15  From this information, we developed a time 
allocation matrix for each program (Appendix Table 6).
16  While it would be unwise to 
consider this methodology measurement-error free, it can identify substantive trends and 
patterns in the activity mix.  Reassuringly, much of what we see in the matrices can be 
corroborated by our knowledge of the program activities and their relative intensities over 
time. 
The next step in the analysis is to associate, where possible, the various 
accounting costs with program activities.  Some accounting line-item costs can be 
allocated directly to certain activities without ambiguity.  For example, the fees paid to 
                                                 
15 For the most part, this exercise was carried out as a retrospective survey.  That approach has the benefit 
that all activities are known, but it suffers from the typical weaknesses of recall data.  For future analyses, 
we would recommend elaborating the activity list and time matrix from the start of the program. 
16 Further details are provided for PROGRESA, PRAF, and RPS in Coady, Perez, and Vera-Llamas (2004); 
CaldØs and Coady (2003); and CaldØs and Maluccio (2004), respectively. The details of the methodology 
varied slightly between countries.  For example, some categories were not relevant to all programs, such as 
supply-side delivery in PROGRESA. 21 
firms delivering the monetary transfers can be allocated directly to the delivery of 
demand-side transfers activity or the cost of collecting the baseline evaluation survey to 
the external evaluation activity.  We refer to these as ￿directly assignable costs.￿  For 
many other costs, such as salaries of management personnel, direct assignment is not 
possible because they cut across program activities.  These are allocated to program 
activities using the time-allocation matrix.  By multiplying total unassigned costs by the 
time-allocation matrix percentages, we can distribute these shared costs across program 
activities.  We refer to these as ￿indirectly assignable costs.￿ 
Activity Cost Shares 
After assigning all costs to activities, we calculate the activity cost shares, i.e., the 
fraction of costs devoted to each activity (Table 3).  For PROGRESA, over the first four 
years of the program, the largest cost items are identification of beneficiaries, delivery of 
transfers, and conditionality, accounting for 34, 22, and 18 percent of total costs 
(excluding transfers), respectively.  The annual profile of these cost shares reflects the 
sequential nature of these activities.  The cost share for identification of beneficiaries 
decreases from 61 percent in 1997 to 3 percent in 2000.  In contrast, the share for 
conditionality activities increases from 8 percent in 1997 to 24 percent in 2000.  
Similarly, the cost share for delivery of transfers increases from 8 percent in 1997 to 41 
percent in 2000.  This shift of costs toward predominantly recurring cost items is 
consistent with the program nearing maturity.  By 2000, recurring activities account for 
85 percent of total program costs. 
In the case of PRAF, over the first four years of the program, activities associated 
with the external evaluation and the identification of beneficiaries (which included the 
incorporation of beneficiaries) were the most important cost items, accounting for 35 and 
26 percent of total program costs, respectively.  These were followed by delivery of 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































costs.  The high cost share for the external evaluation explains a large portion of the 
difference in the program average CTRs for PRAF relative to PROGRESA.
17 
In addition to declining fixed costs, the evolution of PRAF cost shares over time 
also reflects the operational difficulties encountered in the program, particularly in 2002.  
In 1999, at the very start of the program, program design and planning accounts for 83 
percent of program costs.  In 2000, activities associated with identifying program 
beneficiaries dominate, accounting for 35 percent of program costs.  In 2001, activities 
associated with distributing transfers and setting up and implementing the monitoring 
system become more important, each accounting for 15￿21 percent of program costs.  
Somewhat unexpectedly, the share of program costs associated with the identification of 
beneficiaries increases substantially in 2002, accounting for 25 percent of program costs.  
This apparently reflects difficulties with the transition to a new program team and 
maintaining and updating beneficiary registration lists.  Looking at the other shares, it 
appears that much of the extra time and resources devoted to this activity came at the 
expense of resources devoted to program monitoring and conditionality.  Since these 
latter activities are important for ensuring that cash transfers are translated into human 
capital improvements, this raises the possibility that the observed time reallocation is 
detrimental to the programs overall cost-effectiveness. 
For RPS, from the start of the pilot in 2000 to end-2002, the largest share of costs 
(22 percent) was spent on external evaluation, as in PRAF.  This was followed closely by 
the 20 percent devoted to implementing the supply side of the program.  Unlike 
PROGRESA and PRAF, RPS contracts, trains, and directly pays private providers to 
deliver the health services, coordinating activities between them and the Ministry of 
Health.  These providers also help monitor the conditionality of the program.  
Internalizing these health service delivery costs in the program has implications for the 
program budget.  The next largest cost category was for general program design, 18 
                                                 
17 This finding, in addition to suggesting it is important to separate out external evaluation costs in the cost 
analysis of programs, raises the issue of whether smaller programs should be underwriting the entire 
evaluation costs, in particular when they arguably generate a number of intellectual public goods. 24 
percent, and included work related to both the pilot phase and the expansion phase that 
started in 2003.  This is a natural consequence of RPS being a pilot:  despite careful 
advance planning, there are always details to work out as a program puts the plans into 
action.  Lastly, during the pilot, about 10 percent of the nontransfer costs were spent on 
identification of beneficiaries, incorporation of beneficiaries, and internal monitoring and 
evaluation. 
When we examine the evolution of the cost shares during the three years of the 
RPS pilot, we find similar patterns related to up-front or fixed investments.  Identification 
of beneficiaries declined in intensity as the program matured.  Household survey work, a 
major component of identification of beneficiaries, was carried out in 2000 and 2001, but 
having fulfilled the pilot phase objective of reaching 10,000 beneficiaries, very little 
activity of this sort was necessary in 2002.  The share devoted to incorporating 
beneficiaries also declined, though the need for continuous updating (e.g., for births and 
other changes in household composition) kept it from altogether disappearing.  The 
fraction spent on program design, however, remained roughly constant.  Disaggregating 
program design and planning activities according to whether they were for the pilot phase 
or for the expansion phase begun in 2003, shows that the former declined substantially 
over the three years, whereas the latter increased in roughly equal proportions￿the 
combined effect is that the total share dedicated to design activities was roughly constant 
over the three years (CaldØs and Maluccio 2004). 
Delivery of demand- and supply-side transfers accounted for more than one-
quarter of costs in 2002, with the latter comprising the majority of those costs.  
Conditionality, i.e., activities related to monitoring whether households are complying 
with the program requirements, has grown in intensity over time, as the number of 
beneficiaries grew.  General program monitoring, including monitoring of supply 
services, also increased substantially over the period.  The rise in 2002 was due in part to 
the implementation of random spot-checks of private providers after some were 
discovered to have been delivering poor quality services.  Presumably, these activities 
had an effect on the quality of services and the overall human capital impact of the 25 
program.  Finally, even though the time devoted to evaluation declined continuously over 
the three years, the cost shares increased, largely due to the lumpiness in payments made 
to external evaluators. 
Activity Cost-Transfer Ratios 
For each activity and program, Table 4 presents annual CTRs and an overall 
program average for the periods for which information is available.  These reflect the 
costs associated with each activity per one-unit transfer to the beneficiary.  The CTR for 
each program activity is simply the cost share for that activity multiplied by the aggregate 
CTR (for all activities), so that their relative sizes reflect the activity cost shares 
presented in Table 3.  Focusing on CTRs by activity type facilitates comparison between 
programs by making clear the composition of the aggregate ratios and also by ensuring 
that the costs included in the aggregate ratio are consistent between programs. 
To further facilitate comparison, the first adjustment is to remove the costs 
associated with external program evaluations that do little to influence the current 
programs (though they may substantially influence redesign and other similar programs).  
Unsurprisingly, given the overall size of PROGRESA, this changes its CTRs little, with 
the average program CTR decreasing from 0.111 to 0.106, and in the final year from 
0.052 to 0.0490.
18  The effect on the other two programs￿ CTRs, however, is substantial.  
The program average CTR for PRAF decreases from 0.499 to 0.325, and there is now an 
annual decline over the period, with the annual CTR for 2002 decreasing from 0.378 to 
0.163 when we remove the costs associated with external evaluation.  For the RPS pilot, 
the program average CTR decreases from 0.629 to 0.489, and the decline in the annual 
CTR is now more pronounced, with the annual CTR for 2002 decreasing from 0.467 with 
external evaluation to 0.331 without.
                                                 
18 The slight difference between the total CTRs from Table 1 reflects adjustments for inflation and capital 
investments made for PROGRESA.  These were not carried out for the other programs, as they made 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Even with these adjustments, the above CTRs are likely to overestimate the long-
run CTRs, since they still include a variety of fixed or quasi-fixed costs.  Earlier, we 
described how one can treat the last year observed for each program as a better estimate 
(than the aggregate) for the program in a mature state.  After excluding external 
evaluations, the final year (for which we have data) annual CTRs are 0.049, 0.163, and 
0.331 for PROGRESA, PRAF, and RPS, respectively.  Based on these numbers, the two 
supply-side programs still appear to cost substantially more, with the RPS pilot costing 
twice as much per unit of transfer as PRAF.  This methodology implicitly assumes that 
the programs are all nearing maturity.  While plausible for PROGRESA, this is less likely 
for the other programs.  PRAF has had operational difficulties associated with updating 
the beneficiary lists, implementing the supply side, and monitoring conditionality.  For 
the RPS pilot, 2002 includes fixed design costs associated with preparing for the 
expansion of the program.  Therefore, the final year annual CTRs are still likely to 
overestimate long-run CTRs. 
Therefore, to better approximate the long-run CTR and provide a fairer 
comparison between programs, we further adjust the CTR by excluding the fixed costs 
we can identify.  The activity categories are roughly sequential in nature, with the first 
three (numbers 1￿3) representing activities that need to be carried out at the outset of the 
program before any transfers are distributed to households or service providers.  We do 
not expect these activities to be important cost components for the mature program.  
Therefore, by subtracting these costs, we can derive better estimates of the long-run 
CTRs.
19  These adjusted estimates are shown in the bottom row of Table 4 and result in 
final-year annual CTRs of 0.041, 0.068, and 0.212 for PROGRESA, PRAF, and RPS, 
respectively.  Based on these ratios, we get the same ranking across programs according 
                                                 
19 It is probable that some of these costs are recurring in the medium term, however, such as activities 
related to the identification of beneficiaries that may include some costs related to periodic updating of 
registration system.  We are implicitly assuming that these are relatively small and are offset by fixed costs 
that exist in the other activities but we do not subtract out.  Alternatively, one can think about the estimates 
excluding the fixed costs as representing lower bounds. 28 
to program costs, but now PRAF is closer to PROGRESA, while the RPS pilot remains 
relatively more costly. 
Apart from the relative complexity of the RPS supply-side intervention,
20 which 
comes with consequent monitoring and conditioning costs, another reason that the cost-
transfer ratio for RPS is higher than the others is related to its being a pilot.  Even within 
the activities we treat as recurring, part of the activities for RPS during the pilot had to do 
with one-time costs, as new modalities were considered and the team explored how best 
to do things.  CaldØs and Maluccio (2004) disaggregate all the various activities into 
fixed and variable components, and find that, indeed, this further reduces the annual 
CTR, particularly in the earlier years. 
CTRs may also differ between programs because their average transfer levels 
differ.  If two programs are identical except for the fact that the average household 
transfer in the first is twice that in the second, then the CTR for the first would be half 
that for the second, assuming the same level of operational efficiency and negligible costs 
directly related to the size of the transfer (such as delivery costs).  When both supply- and 
demand-side transfers are included for RPS and PRAF, the average transfer for RPS is 
similar to that for PROGRESA, whereas that for PRAF is approximately one-third the 
size.  Therefore, increasing the level of transfers in PRAF by a factor of three would 
decrease our estimate of the long-term CTR for the program to 0.024, even lower than 
PROGRESA.  This is somewhat surprising, since PROGRESA involves only a demand-
side intervention (which, based on these programs￿ experiences, we believe is less costly 
to implement than a supply-side component), and RPS appears to be an effectively run 
intervention as documented in its impact evaluation (Maluccio and Flores 2004).  We 
have already noted that the lower costs for PRAF are due, in part, to fewer resources 
                                                 
20 Table 2 shows that RPS has, by far, the largest relative supply-side transfers, suggesting that only for 
RPS would a simulation netting out the ￿supply side￿ of these programs make a substantial difference in 
the estimated CTRs.  We simulate the CTR for RPS if it had no supply-side services by subtracting out all 
costs that we can associate with the supply side, and the corresponding transfers.  The 2002 annual CTR 
declines from 0.211 reported in the text to 0.162, indicating that the supply-side transfers are, indeed, more 
cost-intensive. 29 
being devoted to conditionality and routine program monitoring and evaluation.  A 
concern, however, is that this may have adverse implications for the effectiveness of the 
program. 
5.  Relating Program Costs to Program Benefits 
To promote their objectives of decreasing current poverty and generating a 
sustained decrease in poverty over time, the three programs have two key design features.  
First, in order to ensure that transfers reach the poorest households, the programs use 
varying combinations of geographic, categorical, and proxy-means targeting methods.  
Second, the transfers are conditioned on households undertaking certain actions intended 
to enhance the nutrition, health, and education outcomes of family members, particularly 
children.  Both of these features require resources, thus increasing the share of 
administrative costs in the program budgets and, consequently, the CTRs. 
We assess the relative importance of the costs associated with these key activities 
by calculating their share in total program costs, after excluding the external evaluation 
and fixed costs described earlier.  We assume that costs associated with the identification 
of beneficiaries are incurred only when household targeting is used￿in the absence of 
household targeting, there is no operational need for the program to collect and analyze 
household information.  While perhaps not entirely true, since even an untargeted 
program may require some sort of household registration system, we are implicitly 
assuming that any such related costs would be minimal.  This would be the case, for 
example, if a reliable and recent census were already available.  Similarly, if there were 
no conditioning, the program would not incur the costs of incorporating households or of 
certifying that beneficiaries are satisfying their responsibilities. 
Table 5 presents the share of targeting and conditioning costs in total program 
costs for all three programs over the periods considered.  Excluding external evaluation 
(the first column for each program), the proportions make clear that targeting and 
conditioning costs are substantial.  Combined, they account for 60, 49, and 31 percent for 30 
PROGRESA, PRAF, and RPS, respectively.  These shares increase modestly when we 
also exclude costs for program design in the share calculation (second column for each 
program).  The relatively low percentage for the RPS pilot partly reflects the fact that 
setting up and implementing the supply side, an activity included in the ￿other￿ category 
in the table, has proved to be very resource intensive.  The absence of these activities in 
PROGRESA increases the relative shares of targeting and conditioning costs.  Targeting 
costs in PRAF are higher than they otherwise would have been, due to the difficulties in 
maintaining the beneficiary identification system.  At the same time, the resources 
allocated to dealing with these problems appear to have come at the expense of 
monitoring conditionality, suggesting that the latter are smaller than would otherwise 
have been the case during a normal operating year.  On balance, it is possible that the 
sum of the two activities is about right, though there is no way for us to be certain.  
Nevertheless, even with these caveats, the message from this simulation is clear:  costs 
devoted to targeting and conditioning form a substantial part of the ongoing operations of 
these programs.  It is essential that these activities generate an adequate return; we turn 
now to an (admittedly crude) assessment of their cost-effectiveness. 
Table 5￿CTR-share of activities 


























Targeting 0.35  0.37    0.35  0.40  0.15  0.19 
Conditioning 0.25  0.27    0.14  0.16  0.16  0.21 
Other activities  0.40  0.36   0.51  0.44  0.69  0.60 
  Total CTR  0.106  0.102  0.325  0.287  0.489  0.376 
 
 
Targeting will be cost-effective if the incurred costs result in a sufficient increase 
in the share of transfers reaching the poorest households, thereby improving the 
programs￿ current poverty alleviation.  The evidence indicates that the payoff from 
targeting has been high across all three programs.  A comparative analysis (MNPTSG 31 
2002) finds that the poorest 40 percent of households received 62, 79, and 80 percent of 
total transfers in PROGRESA, PRAF, and RPS, respectively.  In other words, these 
relatively ￿poor￿ households receive from 1.5 to 2 times their population shares.  To put 
this performance in perspective, for the more than 100 programs reviewed by Coady, 
Grosh, and Hoddinott (2002), the median targeting performance was consistent with 50 
percent of program benefits accruing to the poorest 40 percent of the population (i.e., the 
poor receiving 1.25 times their population share).  The three programs discussed here all 
ranked in the top third of those reviewed in Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2002). 
For two of the programs, PROGRESA and RPS, the human capital impacts have 
also been substantial (Skoufias 2004; Maluccio and Flores 2004).  For education, the 
main effect of PROGRESA was to increase enrollment rates in secondary school (Schultz 
2000; Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd 2001).  Among those who successfully completed 
primary school, the program increased enrollment rates in the first year of middle school 
by 15 percentage points for girls and 7 percentage points for boys.  In the RPS, primary 
enrollment rates in Grades 1￿4 were about 70 percent before the program and increased a 
massive 18 percentage points with the program (Maluccio and Flores 2004). 
The effects on nutrition were also substantial.  In PROGRESA, prior to the 
program, stunting levels for children aged 12￿36 months were very high, at 44 percent.  
The program had a substantial effect on reducing the probability of stunting, increasing 
the annual mean growth rate by 16 percent (or 1 centimeter per year) for these children 
(Behrman and Hoddinott 2000; Gertler 2000).  There is also evidence of a substantial 
increase in food consumption and dietary diversity (Hoddinott and Skoufias 2003).  RPS 
has also had an enormous impact on a range of health and nutrition indicators.  The 
percentage of children under age 3 who were weighed in the past six months increased by 
30 percentage points, from around 60 percent prior to the program.  This was 
accompanied by a decline of six percentage points in the prevalence of stunting for those 
under 5 (from 42 percent before the program), an unprecedented decline in such a short 
period of time.  The results on expenditures suggest that not only have the total 
expenditures on food increased, but so, too, has the food budget share, by nearly four 32 
percentage points.  The program has had a beneficial impact on dietary diversity; both the 
number of different food items consumed and the nutritional quality of the diet improved, 
with households eating more meat, fats, and fruits (Maluccio and Flores 2004). 
Preliminary evidence regarding the human capital impacts of PRAF suggests that 
these are smaller than for the other two programs (IFPRI 2003).  For example, it appears 
to have had little impact on primary enrollment rates (which were already quite high), 
although there was an improvement in dropout rates.  Visits by children to health clinics 
for growth monitoring and vaccinations increased in areas with the demand-side program, 
but the program does not appear to have improved health outcomes.  Nor was there any 
effect on the nutritional status of children as measured by child growth indicators.  These 
small effects are consistent with the evidence of operational difficulties in terms of 
implementing the supply side and monitoring conditionality.  These results reinforce 
concerns that the low CTR of PRAF comes at the expense of the program￿s overall 
effectiveness.  Possibly more important, however, we must bear in mind that these 
relatively small effects reflect not only the operational difficulties encountered in PRAF, 
but also the lower transfer level per household compared to the other programs￿in 
PRAF, the transfer was calculated as an amount to compensate for the opportunity cost of 
children attending school, and was therefore much smaller than the other programs. 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper has assessed the cost-efficiency of PROGRESA, PRAF, and RPS by 
focusing on the cost-transfer ratio, defined as the ratio of nontransfer costs (i.e., 
administrative costs) to transfers.  In doing so, we have demonstrated that for a 
meaningful assessment of cost-efficiency, it is misleading to make calculations using 
only the typically available raw accounting data, the approach normally taken (Coady, 
Grosh, and Hoddinott 2002).  Rather, one must delve into the details and activities of the 
program.  Features of the program, and how the CTR is calculated, are important for how 
it is used and interpreted.  This is particularly true for start-up programs, which typically 33 
have a lot of up-front fixed costs associated with design and setting up operations, and for 
complex programs, such as conditional cash transfer programs, that have a number of 
costs associated with specific design features.  It is essential to keep in mind that this 
examination of program costs, transfers, and CTRs includes not only the costs required to 
transfer the money to the beneficiaries, but also costs of activities that may enhance the 
effectiveness of the program (e.g., targeting or monitoring of conditionality).  Therefore, 
in addition to the level of costs, we focused on the structure of costs as reflected in the 
various activities involved in each program.  These details must be considered to make 
sensible comparisons between programs, either within the same country or between 
countries. 
This paper begins to fill the large gap that exists in the empirical knowledge of the 
cost structures of poverty alleviation programs.  In the context of three large poverty 
alleviation programs in Latin America, we have shown how typically available cost data, 
augmented by program-level information on time use, can be used to undertake an 
assessment of the cost-efficiency of the program.  The analysis also underscores that the 
estimates we present, and how they should be interpreted and used for comparison 
between alternatives, depends sensitively on how they were calculated.  Very different 
numbers emerge when one takes snapshots of programs at different stages or when we 
include or exclude up-front setup or fixed costs.  This reflects the fact that fixed costs are 
typically a more important component of total program costs earlier in the life of the 
program.  Over time, average fixed costs converge to zero, so that the average CTR (or, 
equivalently, share of administrative costs in total costs) converges to the ratio of 
recurring operating costs to total transfers (or to their share in total costs). 
How do these three programs￿ cost-efficiencies compare to those of other poverty 
alleviation programs in the region?  As highlighted at the outset, such evidence is hard to 
come by and, where it exists, is often not comparable.  Grosh (1994) finds that the share 
of administrative costs for programs she considered ranged from under 1 percent to 29 
percent, with a median of 9 percent.  For programs involving proxy-means tests, the 
median was slightly higher, at 10 percent.  In Section 4, we calculated various CTRs for 34 
each of the programs, two of which serve as lower and upper bounds of our best 
estimates of the long-run CTR.  These are the final year annual CTRs for the program 
without external evaluation and all fixed costs (Table 4, bottom row), and is the program 
without external evaluation and program design, but including the other fixed costs that 
may, to some extent, be recurring (Table 4, penultimate row).  These produce a range for 
each of the programs of 0.041￿0.047 for PROGRESA, 0.068￿0.161 for PRAF, and 
0.212￿0.245 for the RPS pilot.  The lower estimated costs for PROGRESA undoubtedly 
reflect, in part, economies of scale (it is a massive program in comparison to the others), 
as well as the fact that it does not have a supply-side component. 
For PROGRESA, even its upper bound CTR of 0.047 compares well with the 
median program reported in Grosh (1994), all the more impressive, given the relative 
complexity of PROGRESA￿s design compared to more conventional social safety net 
programs.  Furthermore, it is very low when compared to the LICONSA (a subsidized 
milk program delivered through state shops in urban areas) and TORTIVALES (a tortilla 
subsidy program) programs in Mexico, which had program costs equivalent to 40 pesos 
and 14 pesos per 100 pesos transferred, respectively (Grosh 1994).  If we assume that the 
median levels reported in Grosh (1994) adequately reflect operating costs, then the lower-
bound CTR for PRAF also compares well with the median program, though this 
conclusion is subject to the caveats made throughout regarding our estimates for PRAF. 
The RPS pilot, however, which has a lower-bound CTR equal to 0.212, appears to be 
relatively expensive.  Of course, RPS is much more complex than conventional poverty 
programs, and there is clear evidence that it has had large human capital impacts￿much 
is being bought with these expenditures. 
In closing, we caution that it is difficult to be certain about these comparisons, 
since it is unclear exactly what is included in the figures quoted in Grosh (1994).
21  It 
may be that the variation in these numbers reflects different cost definitions rather than 
                                                 
21 Grosh (1994) discusses a range of difficulties associated with collecting and analyzing cost data for 
poverty alleviation programs.  One of the biggest drawbacks faced by her study was ￿the imprecision in 
calculating administrative costs￿ (30). 35 
different levels of cost-efficiency.  It is difficult to compare them more formally without 
having substantially more detail about the cost structures of the other Latin American 
programs.  The analysis of these three programs constitutes an important contribution to 
this research gap, both in terms of providing a thorough cost analysis of the programs and 
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